A cascade of coups since 2020 in six former French colonies in the Sahel and West Africa—Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Niger—has presented new opportunities for Iran, Russia, and other Western adversaries.
Support for the coups has come from local populations that have grown tired of French and other Western neo-colonialism as well as the presence of French troops. With the new juntas in power, France’s influence in the Sahel and West Africa teeters and there are many questions about how this region’s geopolitical landscape will evolve.
Iran and other opponents of Western dominance see the coups as a valuable geopolitical opportunity to foster stronger relationships in Africa and, more broadly, the Global South.
Iranian officials’ rhetoric stresses a common struggle against Western imperialism. As the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported, President Ebrahim Raisi—who recently visited Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Kenya—“praised the resistance of African countries against colonization as a symbol of their awakening and vigilance.”
Iran has deepening relationships with two Sahelian countries—Burkina Faso and Mali—that are particularly important in the aftermath of recent coups in Ouagadougou and Bamako.
In 2022, Burkina Faso experienced two coups which strained Ouagadougou’s relationship with France. With their country bogged down by a gruesome jihadist insurgency, Burkinabe officials decided that Russia was the most “reasonable” choice for a counter-terrorism partnership. In January 2023, France announced the withdrawal of its forces from Burkina Faso as demanded by the junta.
Originally called Upper Volta, the country gained independence in 1960 and was renamed Burkina Faso in 1984. Its revolutionary leader, Thomas Sankara, is often referred to as the “African Che Guevera.” Today, the ruling junta’s commitment to an anti-imperialist and pan-African ideology mirrors Iran’s anti-Western stance.
Burkina Faso’s Foreign Minister Olivia Rouamba visited Tehran recently. She met with top Iranian officials, including Raisi, who, according to IRNA, “expressed Iran’s readiness to transfer its experiences and achievements to friendly countries, particularly in Africa.” Reportedly, Rouamba also stated her country’s commitment to “bolstering mutual cooperation with Iran, noting that African countries, including Burkina Faso, draw inspiration from the resistance and perseverance of the Islamic Revolution against arrogance and imperialism.” Ouagadougou’s chief diplomat said that increasing Burkinabe-Iranian cooperation is a “top priority” for her nation, which views Iran as a “friendly and brotherly country.”
In January, 2023, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Ali Bagheri paid a visit to Ouagadougou to exchange “views on ways of forging closer economic cooperation between the two countries, increasing mutual trade and holding exhibitions showcasing Iranian products.” Tehran also took advantage of the opportunity to send a signal to Paris, stating that “the independence day for African countries was the day when they managed to extricate themselves from the clutches of European governments that violate human rights.”
In 2020/21, there were two coups in Mali. Colonel Assimi Goïta seized power in August 2020, following popular protests calling for then-President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s resignation. Nine months later, the Malian military arrested the country’s interim civilian president and prime minister. Tensions rose between Mali and France as opposition to France’s regional activities grew across Malian society.
In 2022, French troops exited Mali. In August 2022, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian visited Bamako, where he spoke about Mali’s “significant status” in Tehran’s foreign policy and his “confidence about a new chapter in fresh Tehran-Bamako ties.”
Russia has opportunistically taken advantage of friction between Sahelian countries and France to put forward Moscow as a trustworthy security provider as terrorism crises in this part of Africa continue to worsen. Russia has sent aircraft, helicopters, modern surveillance radars, and trainers to Mali. The Wagner Group also has a presence in that country, along with the Central African Republic, Libya, and Sudan. Meanwhile, the Nigerien junta, which usurped power on July 26, has asked for the Wagner Group’s help. Additionally, there have been suspicions that the Wagner Group has plans for Burkina Faso and U.S. intelligence claims that the Russian mercenary group was possibly plotting to kill the Washington-backed president of Chad.
Credible and concrete information about Iranian-Russian coordination in the Sahel is scant. Yet, some analysts assess that Tehran and Moscow are “working together to replace Western influence in the country [Mali] by seeking to provide economic support and food supplies, such as wheat along with oil products and fertilizers, as well as security cooperation and the rehabilitation of the Malian army.”
Along with Russia, Iran hopes to help fill the void left by France’s departure and assist the Malian military defeat Sunni Muslim jihadists. The Iranian leadership has been trying to convince Malian officials to view the Islamic Republic as a solid partner in this struggle against Islamic State- and al-Qaeda-affiliated militias that have terrorized the Malian people for years. Iran’s message is that, based on its record of combatting the Islamic State in the Levant, Iranians are suited to help Mali.
For all the ideological dimensions of Iran’s foreign policy agenda in Burkina Faso, Mali, and other African states, economics also play a major role. Against the backdrop of continuing U.S.-led sanctions against Iran and a failure to revive the 2015 nuclear accord, Tehran is looking to the East and the Global South for ways to circumvent sanctions and bolster its anemic economy.
Burkina Faso, Mali, and other countries in the Sahel are major repositories of gold, uranium, lithium, manganese, phosphates, limestone, zinc, bauxite, salt, granite, and other valuable natural resources. Deals between Iran and these African governments can potentially provide opportunities for Iranian companies to exploit this natural resource wealth and bypass crippling sanctions. Yet there are obvious limits to what these developing countries in Africa can offer Iran.
The Islamic Republic’s determination to grow its clout in the Sahel and West Africa should been seen as less about bringing major economic benefits than as part of Iran’s broader strategy to make it appear less isolated on the international stage. Iran has recently been asked to join the BRICs grouping of emerging economies. And besides his African tour in July, Raisi visited Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba — three adversaries of the U.S. in Latin America.
The recent wave of coups throughout the Sahel provides more opportunity for Iran to advance its anti-Western agenda. Officials in Washington and Europe alarmed by Tehran’s growing ability to circumvent sanctions could start seeing the Sahel as a new economic battleground with Iran.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project.
Source link : https://www.stimson.org/2023/iran-sees-potential-gain-in-loss-of-western-influence-in-the-sahel/
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Publish date : 2023-09-22 07:00:00
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