Editor’s Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.
Africa File, May 2, 2024: Iran Pursues Economic and Military Influence; Burkinabe Abuses; Mali Kills Wanted IS Commander; Insurgents Strengthen in East Africa
Authors: Liam Karr, Matthew Gianitsos, Josie Von Fischer, and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick
Data Cutoff: May 2, 2024, at 10 a.m.
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
Iran in Africa: Iran is using military exports as a vehicle to pursue objectives in Africa such as acquiring uranium in Niger and a permanent Red Sea port in Sudan. The United States has tried to push against these efforts through bilateral and multilateral pressure and negotiating alternative solutions. Iran is also trying to expand its economic ties across Africa to mitigate sanctions, as demonstrated by its second annual Iran-Africa trade summit. Numerous meetings between Iran and Burkinabe and Zimbabwean officials indicate both countries are a particular focus.
Burkina Faso: The Burkinabe junta is massacring its civilians and eroding their civil and political liberties as part of its aggressive counterinsurgency strategy. The atrocities and erosion of civil rights are all part of the junta’s “total war” strategy, which emphasizes strong militarized responses and disregards political efforts and dialogue with militants and affected communities. The junta has also expanded the use of civilian auxiliaries, who are often poorly trained and further exacerbate ethnic violence as a key aspect of this strategy. Violence against civilians is counterproductive and strengthens al Qaeda– and IS-linked insurgents’ ability to operate in affected areas by eroding state legitimacy and incentivizing affected civilians to cooperate with the insurgents.
Mali: Malian forces killed a high-ranking IS field commander who was involved in the 2017 Tongo Tongo attack that killed four American soldiers. The IS Sahelian affiliate will likely continue to strengthen, even though the loss may degrade its tactical or operational planning in the short term. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate is also strengthening in the country by increasingly using mass kidnappings to coerce civilians into nonaggression agreements in central Mali, strengthening its support zones. The group will likely use strengthened support zones to facilitate larger, more complex, and more frequent attacks in the area’s major towns.
Somalia: The United States suspended rations supplies to the US-trained Danab special forces after the Somali government reported some members were stealing and reselling the rations. The suspension of rations is only a small setback as the US provides much more extensive support to Danab because the unit is a prominent part of US and the Somali counterterrorism strategy in Somalia. This distraction occurred as al Shabaab reestablished a position in a forested area of south-central Somalia, threatening hard-won Somali gains in south-central Somalia that the government has largely held since liberating areas there in 2022. The al Shabaab foothold threatens key lines of communication and could serve as a staging ground for large-scale attacks against key towns in south-central Somalia.
Mozambique: The Islamic State affiliate in Mozambique conducted four attacks outside of Cabo Delgado province in its second southward push of 2024, which risks undermining state legitimacy on a local and national level by disrupting voter registration campaigns in northeastern Mozambique. The group’s continued resurgence remains at odds with pending regional security force drawdowns and jeopardizes investment opportunities that would strengthen the local and international economies.
Assessments:
Iran in Africa
Author: Liam Karr and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick
Iran is using military exports as a vehicle to pursue objectives in Africa such as acquiring uranium in Niger and Red Sea access in Sudan. France-based investigative news site Africa Intelligence reported on April 30 that Iran and Niger had been negotiating since the end of 2023 for Niger to provide 300 tons of uranium yellowcake to Iran in exchange for drones and surface-to-air missiles.[1] This is a significant amount of uranium, equaling Iran’s entire domestic production in 2019.[2] Iran has significantly scaled up its domestic yellowcake production in recent years, however, which led CTP to inaccurately assess in January 2024 that it would not pursue Nigerien uranium.[3] These would not be Niger’s first drones; Niger already owns six Turkish drones that it purchased in 2022.[4]
Iran has also sent drones to other African countries as a key part of its engagement. Iran began sending drones to the Sudanese army in early 2024 and unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a permanent naval base in Sudan in exchange for a helicopter-carrying ship according to a March 2024 Wall Street Journal report.[5] An Iranian naval base at Port Sudan would directly support Iranian out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Iran has also sent drones to separatist groups in Western Sahara to undermine Morocco—which it has had a poor relationship with for over a decade—and the Ethiopian government to use in its civil war.[6]
The United States has tried to push back against these efforts through bilateral and multilateral pressure and alternative solutions. Africa Intelligence and the Wall Street Journal reported that the US told Nigerien officials during March meetings that any sale of uranium to Iran would lead to sanctions, which contributed to the junta annulling defense cooperation and eventually kicking out the over 600 US troops still stationed in the country.[7] Africa Intelligence also reported that the US identified a Canadian company as a potential purchaser and is seeking other alternative buyers.[8] The United States has voiced concern about the Iranian drone shipments to the Sudanese army and encouraged regional states to press Iran to disengage.[9] It has not directly negotiated with Sudanese leaders on the issue to the same extent as it has in Niger, however.
Niger selling uranium to Iran would likely cripple Niger’s economy by inviting sanctions and significantly reducing the uranium it has to export. Regional sanctions after the July 2023 coup alone forced the junta to significantly cut the government budget by 40 percent and default on debt payments of more than $500 million.[10] The 300 tons of yellowcake involved in the deal would also be nearly half the 700 tons the junta has stockpiled.
The junta would struggle to replenish this loss given that sanctions would lead the French mining company currently operating the mine to stop production, forcing the junta to find a new provider willing to evade international sanctions. The company has already halted production since September to start routine maintenance earlier than planned after sanctions affected logistics.[11] This would severely limit the uranium Niger has to sell, which makes up 75 percent of its total exports.[12] The junta is already trying to speed up the opening of an alternative mining site currently owned by a Canadian company.[13]
Iran is also attempting to expand its economic ties to Africa to mitigate the effects of sanctions. Iran held its second annual Iran-Africa trade summit in Tehran, Iran, on April 26.[14] Iranian media reported that the summit aims to promote economic cooperation between Iran and Africa. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi specifically promoted state-level cooperation on resource extraction, strengthening supply chains, and private Iranian investment in areas like agriculture, industry, mining, and medicine.[15] Iranian media reported that officials from over 30 African Union member states attended the summit.[16] This number is a noticeable drop from the over 40 African countries that reportedly attended the inaugural event in 2023.[17] Iran claimed that its exports to Africa totaled $1.183 billion, a slight decrease from 2022 but still far ahead of pre-Raisi figures.[18]
The Raisi administration has long sought to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa as part of its broader efforts to undermine Western influence and mitigate Western sanctions through non-Western engagement.[19] Raisi focused his July 2023 trips to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—then marking the first Iranian presidential visit to Africa in 11 years—on improving economic ties with these countries.[20] Greater bilateral trade with Africa helps Iran to increase its capital inflows to prevent economic collapse under Western sanctions and normalizes economic cooperation with non-Western countries despite sanctions.
Iran-Africa trade remains a tiny portion of its overall gross domestic product, however, and will not solve the problems that cause Iran’s economic instability.[21] Fundamental economic reforms—such as reducing the dominance of parastatal organizations in Iran’s economy and combating corruption and nepotism—would be necessary to meaningfully improve Iran’s economy.[22] Iran has also struggled to follow through on its agreements with African countries due to its economic difficulties.[23]
Prominent Iranian officials held several separate meetings with Burkinabe and Zimbabwean leaders during the Iran-Africa trade summit and subsequent international trade exhibition from April 26 to May 1. Raisi discussed numerous areas of cooperation when he separately met with Zimbabwean Vice President Constantino Chiwenga and Burkinabe Prime Minister Apollinaire J. Kyélem de Tambèla on the sidelines of the trade summit on April 26.[24] Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber called for expanding economic ties and conducting trade in local currencies during separate meetings with both leaders on April 27.[25] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani also expressed Iran’s readiness to increase cooperation with Zimbabwe while meeting Chiwenga on April 29.[26] Tambèla met with Iranian Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian on April 30.[27]
Zimbabwe has historically been a close partner of Iran, whereas Burkina Faso is a newer partner. Zimbabwe had closely cooperated with Iran, partially due to the US sanctions on both countries that led them to cooperate based on mutual exclusion from the international system.[28] Raisi has tried to revitalize these ties, as demonstrated by his July 2023 visit during which Iran and Zimbabwe signed 12 agreements.[29] Burkina Faso has become a new partner of Iran since the country’s current junta took control in September 2022. Burkinabe officials signed several agreements on energy, mining, pharmaceuticals, and vocational training in Tehran in October 2023.[30]
Iran may seek gold from both countries, either through acquiring access as part of resource extraction deals or payments to private Iranian companies. Iranian knowledge-based companies are a key aspect of Iran’s economic engagement efforts with Africa.[31] These companies are typically private organizations that are less vulnerable to sanctions due to their work in humanitarian fields such as medicine, food supply-chain optimization, agricultural mechanization, and crop yield maximization.[32] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and regime-affiliated outlets have previously encouraged increased economic engagement with Africa to obtain gold payments that Iran can use to evade sanctions.[33] Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe are among the top 10 gold producers on the continent.[34]
Figure 1. Notable Iranian Meetings with African Leaders: Since Iran-Africa Summit on April 26
Source: Liam Karr.
Iran may seek to export arms to some African Union member states such as Burkina Faso as part of its effort to improve ties with African states. Iranian officials have repeatedly expressed interest in using arms sales to generate revenue for the economy, particularly following Iran’s success in supplying Russia with drones to use in Ukraine.[35] The Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien juntas could be amenable to such sales to combat the growing Salafi-jihadi threat in their countries. Weapons sales from Tehran could address their needs while aligning with their anti-Western and aggressively militarized counterinsurgency outlooks.[36] Iran has sent Ababil-3 multi-role and Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara since 2021, setting a potential precedent for future shipments to the Sahel.[37] Turkey currently supplies drones to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, however. Burkina Faso has purchased Turkish drones as recently as April 8.[38]
Burkina Faso
Author: Liam Karr
The Burkinabe junta is massacring its civilians and eroding their civil and political liberties as part of its aggressive counterterrorism strategy. Human Rights Watch (HRW) published on April 25 that the Burkinabe military summarily executed at least 223 civilians in a February massacre in the worst single military abuse in Burkina Faso since 2015.[39] The slaughter took place across two villages and included 56 children.[40] The survivors said the massacre was in retaliation for an al Qaeda–linked attack targeting nearby military barracks earlier that day.[41]
Burkinabe security forces have increasingly targeted civilians in several other large-scale collective punishment massacres and more regular violence since junta leader Capt. Ibrahim Traore took power on September 30, 2022.[42] The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded that security forces attacked civilians 65 percent more frequently in the first 18 months of Traore’s reign than in the previous 18 months.[43] The severity of the abuses against civilians is even more stark. ACLED recorded that Burkinabe state forces killed over 1,000 civilians in the Traore era, which is more than three times the same amount of time in the immediate pre-Traore period.[44] Other large-scale collective massacres have contributed to this number. The Burkinabe Army executed at least 156 civilians in April 2023 and nearly another 100 people in a massacre in November 2023.[45]
Figure 2. Burkinabe State Forces Attacks on Civilians, 2021–24
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.
The junta has banned numerous news sources covering its human rights abuses or publishing anything critical of the government, greatly restricting the Burkinabe public’s access to independent information. The junta cut access to the BBC, HRW, and Voice of America on April 25, the day that HRW published its report. The junta further suspended British publication The Guardian, French newspapers Le Monde and Ouest-France, German broadcaster Deutsche Welle, French broadcaster TV5 Monde, and Swiss publication Ecofin Agency on April 28.[46] The junta had already banned several prominent French outlets in 2023.[47]
The Burkinabe junta has also exploited an emergency law to forcibly conscript anyone speaking out against the junta since November 2023, further shrinking civic space. This has included doctors, lawyers, journalists, open-source researchers reporting on the conflict, and opposition politicians.[48] Burkinabe courts ruled some of the conscriptions illegal, but many targeted civil society activists have either been unable to challenge their conscription or have gone into hiding.[49]
The atrocities and erosion of civil rights are part of Traore’s “total war” strategy that emphasizes strong militarized responses and cuts to political efforts and dialogue with militants and affected communities.[50] This includes indiscriminately targeting civilians suspected of working with jihadist insurgents. The largest massacres have been in retaliation for insurgent attacks on nearby military sites, and survivors of the massacres have said that the state forces accused civilians of cooperating with insurgents.[51] Traore has defended conscription by saying that “individual freedoms [are] not superior to national freedom.”[52] Junta officials have also labeled negative media coverage such as the April 25 HRW report campaigns to “discredit our fighting forces.”[53]
Traore has also expanded the use of civilian auxiliaries, who are often poorly trained and further exacerbate ethnic violence as a key aspect of this total war strategy. Traore launched a campaign in October 2022 to recruit 50,000 civilian auxiliaries to address the Burkinabe military’s inherent manpower shortages and stem the rapidly escalating insurgency.[54] Burkinabe authorities claimed over 90,000 Burkinabe enlisted, which marks an enormous expansion on preexisting efforts that began in 2020 to mobilize civilians under a formal auxiliary group called Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland—or Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDPs).[55] Traore has quickly involved the conscripted units in offensive operations against suspected insurgents. VDP units participated in 269 offensive engagements in the first 18 months of Traore’s rule, compared to only 78 in the 18 months before October 2022.[56]
VDP units serve both counterinsurgency and regime-security purposes. These units directly report to the nearest military detachment, gendarmerie brigade, or police unit in their home area. The units have improved Burkina Faso’s capacity and made state forces more tactically effective through their local knowledge.[57] However, VDP members only receive two to three weeks of training before deploying, limiting their independent effectiveness.[58] Many VDP members also strongly support Traore, creating a useful and armed support base that provides some regime security against rival security force factions.[59]
VDP units had already perpetuated ethnic-linked violence before Traore took power and are now spreading those issues at an even greater scale due to their growing role. The government built the initial VDP units on preexisting self-defense militias that had mobilized since the beginning of the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in Burkina Faso in 2015.[60] This meant that the units were primarily recruited from these sedentary communities or people relatively unaffected by the insurgency.[61] Fulani communities, one of the most stigmatized and affected ethnic groups, have very few VDP members or village-level VDP forces.[62] This led to a consistent pattern of ethnically motivated VDP violence against Fulani villages that persisted before Traore’s rule.[63] However, the VDP has also increased the rate and severity of violence against civilians under Traore as their operations expand, which has continued to disproportionately affect Fulani civilians.[64]
Figure 3. VDP Attacks on Civilians, 2021–24
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.
Security force abuses are counterproductive and strengthen the insurgents’ ability to operate in affected areas by eroding state legitimacy and incentivizing affected civilians to cooperate with the insurgents. Army massacres lead civilians to either flee the area for government-held cities or cooperate with insurgents for protection if they believe the army will already kill them under the assumption of cooperating with the groups. The insurgents win either way because both outcomes degrade security forces’ local intelligence about the area, meaning the insurgents can operate with less fear of local civilians collaborating with security forces.
The Burkinabe junta has also rarely investigated or prosecuted rights abuses, especially in cases of mass violence.[65] This fundamental lack of justice further encourages civilians to support insurgent groups as the only way to secure vengeance and justice against the perpetrators. The groups have long appealed to ethnic grievances and growing abuses against the Fulani to recruit and operate in Burkina Faso.[66] JNIM was one of the first to report on the February massacre only days after it happened, positioning itself as a reliable source of information in an increasingly limited information space and an avenger and protector of abused civilians.[67]
Mali
Authors: Liam Karr and Matthew Gianitsos
Malian forces killed a high-ranking ISSP commander who was involved in the 2017 Tongo Tongo attack that killed four American soldiers. Malian soldiers killed Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) field commander Abu Huzeifa, also known as Higgo, in a combined ground-air operation near the town of Indelimane, near the Malian-Nigerien border, on April 28.[68] The United States and other countries had placed a $5 million bounty on Huzeifa for participating in the ISSP ambush of American and Nigerien forces.[69] Local sources told reputable France24 journalist Wassim Nasr that a pro-government militia conducted the operation; however, the group’s leader congratulated the Malian armed forces on killing Huzeifa.[70]
Figure 4. Alliance of Sahel States (AES) Battle ISSP Expansion
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project; Matt Gianitsos.
Huzeifa is the seventh ISSP or JNIM commander that Malian forces have claimed to have killed or arrested so far in 2024.[71] This surpasses the at least six claimed commander killings in 2022 and 2023.[72] The Malian junta may be targeting more military leaders as part of its counterinsurgency strategy or increasingly publicizing these operations to boost morale and public perception. The only other verifiable high-profile killing in 2024 was ISSP commander Abdul Wahab Ould Choghib in January.[73] Choghib was a prominent figure in charge of community relations.[74] Targeted raids against high-ranking leaders require Malian networks to penetrate insurgent support zones to provide information on the target’s movements and locations to inform the operations.
Huzeifa’s death may degrade ISSP’s tactical or operational planning in the short term but will not single-handedly slow the group’s growth in the Sahel. Decapitation strikes in Africa and across the globe have proven to be ineffective at permanently degrading Salafi-jihadi groups absent a more comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy.[75] Similar decapitation strikes by French forces in the Sahel over the past decade highlight this point, as they failed to permanently degrade the al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates, which ultimately contributed to the popular dissatisfaction with French security assistance that ended in France leaving Mali in 2022.[76] Targeted killings tend to temporarily decrease the quality or rate of terror attacks by limiting group resources and institutional knowledge.[77] However, these setbacks are temporary, and ISSP’s size, deep roots in the region, and strong structure will mitigate these impacts.[78]
ISSP’s upward trajectory in recent years indicates the Malian government still lacks the military capacity to capitalize on this success, much less implement a comprehensive strategy to permanently degrade the group. The UN observed that the territory under ISSP control doubled between 2022 and the first half of 2023, including swaths of northeastern Mali that its al Qaeda–linked rivals and communal militias previously controlled.[79] The group has since instituted governance measures in rural areas under its control and besieged the regional capital Menaka, allowing it to tax local economic activity into and out of the town.[80] The group has also strengthened across the border in Niger since Niger’s July 2023 coup, as exemplified by increasingly deadly attacks and the greater rate and geographic scope of its taxation efforts.[81]
JNIM in central Mali: Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate JNIM is increasingly using mass abductions to strengthen its influence in central Mali. Militants from Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) kidnapped over 200 civilians across two separate attacks in central Mali’s Mopti region on April 16 and 18.[82] JNIM militants intercepted passenger buses along the RN15 in Bandiagara Cercle on April 16 and led the hostages into a nearby forest. The group released civilians from towns and villages who had signed nonaggression agreements with JNIM and has continued to hold others after issuing a ransom for their release.[83] ACLED reported that JNIM also abducted nearly 100 travelers in another attack along the RN16 in Douentza Cercle on April 18.[84]
JNIM has increasingly used this abduction tactic to create support zones in central Mali since November 2023.[85] JNIM militants seized transport buses and kidnapped passengers in central Mali four times in the fourth quarter of 2023, two of which took place in the same section of the RN15 highway as the April 16 kidnapping.[86] JNIM militants were also able to abduct several merchants from two buses near the RN16 highway in neighboring Douentza Cercle on December 10, 2023, and seize a transport bus on the section of RN15 between Bandiagara and Sévaré on December 25, 2023, about 20 miles from where the group conducted its most recent mass kidnappings.[87]
Figure 5. JNIM Abduction Campaign in Central Mali
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project; Matt Gianitsos.
The group uses these attacks to expand the areas in which it can move freely, conduct effective logistics, and support its forces by coercing targeted areas into accepting agreements in exchange for the release of hostages.[88] These deals often eliminate local resistance and cut local support for security forces, degrading their ability to operate in the area.[89] JNIM has expanded its governance in smaller central Malian villages by securing similar agreements through threats or violence since 2017, wherein JNIM will agree to allow normal activity to resume and not to attack civilians in exchange for residents’ noncooperation with security forces and occasionally practicing shari’a law.[90]
JNIM’s abductions undermine the legitimacy of the Malian state even among civilians that do not immediately agree to JNIM terms. These abductions and the support they generate can also be lucrative in terms of acquiring material resources that enable JNIM’s operations. JNIM militants often demand high ransoms and taxes as part of its nonaggression deals.[91] JNIM’s mass abductions also undermine civilians’ confidence in Malian security forces.[92] Civilians have aired their frustrations with the Malian government and called for an increase in military presence near their communities by organizing demonstrations and promising to repeatedly blockade the RN15 highway if their requests are not fulfilled.[93] Delayed responsiveness or inaction on the part of the government and Malian security forces increases the appeal of making agreements with JNIM to guarantee these villages’ security.
JNIM’s strengthened support zones in central Mali will enable the group to organize larger, more complex, and more frequent attacks against security forces in major towns. CTP previously assessed that JNIM will use its strengthened support zones to increase operations on major population centers and security forces in central Mali to further its broader goal of delegitimizing the Malian government.[94] JNIM increased its attack frequency by nearly 15 percent between the last quarter of 2023 and the first quarter of 2024.[95]
At least nine first-quarter attacks targeted Malian security forces and Wagner mercenaries operating in or near towns and villages in central Mali.[96] These operations include four attacks in the region’s capital city, which is the most since June 2023.[97] JNIM launched multiple suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attacks targeting Malian army camps in Mopti and central Mali around this time, in April and July 2023.[98] JNIM also conducted a complex attack using weaponized drones for the first time on April 14, 2024, on a Dozo traditional hunter camp just north of the RN15 highway, highlighting other ways in which it is using support zones to increase attack capability and complexity.[99]
The absence of counterinsurgency pressure on JNIM’s rural havens in central Mali contributes to JNIM’s ability to strengthen its influence among civilians outside of major towns and enables future attacks. Malian security forces conducted few counterterrorism operations targeting JNIM’s rural support areas in central Mali despite a slight increase in overall operational pace. They have instead focused their efforts near major cities and along critical roadways.[100] CTP previously assessed that Malian security forces were unlikely to be able to contest JNIM in central Mali following the withdrawal of UN forces that contributed to road security.[101] The Malian army and Wagner Group mercenaries halved their counterinsurgency operations in central Mali between August and December 2023 to give priority to fighting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali, which contributed to a significant decrease in counterinsurgency pressure across the Mopti region in the fourth quarter of 2023.[102]
Somalia
Author: Liam Karr
The United States suspended rations supplies to the US-trained Danab special forces after the SFG reported some members were stealing and reselling the rations. The SFG said it had detained the troops involved and launched an investigation into the allegations.[103] The United States last reviewed its support for Danab in October 2021 after the SFG deployed some soldiers against an anti–al Shabaab religious militia in central Somalia, which was outside of the specific anti–al Shabaab focus the US support is intended for.[104] The United States suspended all support for non-US-mentored forces in 2017 due to repeated similar corruption allegations.[105]
The suspension of rations is a small setback given the extent of US support for Danab. US forces and contractors have trained Danab recruits since setting up the brigade in 2014, and the US provides the group with its supplies and self-defense drone support.[106] These forces are primarily suited for special operations raids, which aligns with the US objectives of targeting al Shabaab leadership.[107] The United States signed a memorandum of understanding with Somalia in February to spend over $100 million constructing up to five military bases across Somalia for Danab battalions.[108]
The Danab forces are also one of the most effective military units in Somalia. US contractors are in charge of selecting recruits, and rigorous standards have made the group much more effective and apolitical compared to other Somali units.[109] Danab forces spearheaded the most intense clearing operations of the SFG’s historical central Somalia offensive in 2022 and 2023.[110] The offensive was the first Somali-led offensive to retake significant territory from al Shabaab, and it resulted in the most comprehensive territorial gains since the mid-2010s.[111] The United States increased drone support for Danab during the offensive, and US officials praised the gains as the most significant development in years.[112]
Al Shabaab in central Somalia: Al Shabaab reestablished a position in a forested area of south-central Somalia, threatening hard-won Somali gains in south-central Somalia that the government has largely held since liberating the areas in 2022. Al Shabaab briefly retook two rural towns in the Middle Shabelle region on April 27, after Somali forces withdrew due to seasonal flooding and clan infighting.[113] The SFG claimed to retake both towns without a fight on April 28, after al Shabaab withdrew to a nearby forest.[114] Al Shabaab embedded itself in this same forest in the third quarter of 2023 when it last tried to establish a foothold in this part of Middle Shabelle to retake areas it lost during the SFG’s 2022 central Somalia offensive.[115] Somali and African Union forces did not clear the group until October, after a month of prolonged fighting.[116]
The al Shabaab foothold threatens key lines of communication and could serve as a staging ground for large-scale attacks against key towns in south-central Somalia. The forest is near critical checkpoints along supply and trade routes linking the Shabelle River Valley to recently liberated areas of central Somalia, such as the district capital Adan Yabal.[117] The group already carried out two complex attacks involving SVBIEDs on both ends of this key corridor during Ramadan 2024.[118] Al Shabaab efforts to degrade these lines of communication would reduce the flow of troops, supplies, humanitarian aid, and other reconstruction efforts in the newly liberated areas.[119] The forest is also within 30 miles of several towns in the Shabelle River Valley, including the district capitals Jalalaqsi and Jowhar.
Figure 6. Al Shabaab Contests the Shabelle River Valley in Central Somalia
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project; Josie Von Fischer.
Al Shabaab may be prepared to launch large-scale attacks on security forces in the area to relieve any counterpressure on this foothold. The group’s recent activity mostly mirrors its efforts to reenter the area in the third quarter of 2023.[120] In the third quarter of 2023, it also conducted two SVBIED attacks on both ends of the corridor, followed by the infiltration effort that security forces eventually uprooted.[121] However, the group conducted six additional SVBIED attacks in other areas of central Somalia during August and September.[122] The comparative lack of additional SVBIED attacks across central Somalia in the current period indicates it could be holding resources to thwart security force counterattacks, unlike its third quarter 2023 effort. However, the group did carry out several other suicide attacks across Somalia during Ramadan 2024.
Mozambique
Author: Josie Von Fischer and Liam Karr
ISMP conducted three attacks outside of Cabo Delgado province in a second southward push that is disrupting key voter registration campaigns in Nampula province. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) has been massing forces, temporarily holding and governing territory, and operating farther south since January 2024 at levels unseen since at least 2022.[123] This began with a three-week reign of terror across Chiure district, the southernmost district in Cabo Delgado province, in February 2024.[124] A detachment of roughly 200 militants conducted 11 attacks between February 9 and February 28.[125]
ISMP reset in March and April before a series of attacks across northern Nampula province between April 24 and 26. [126] ISMP had not conducted attacks in Chiure district or Nampula province since October 2022.[127] This 2022 expansion campaign lasted from June to November 2022, with the group attacking new areas the most in June, followed by smaller aftershocks in August–September and October–November, before attacks in these areas ceased entirely in February 2023.[128]
Figure 7. ISMP Sustains Southward Push in Mozambique
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project; Josie Von Fischer.
ISMP is likely conducting attacks farther south at least partially for propaganda purposes. The group publicized attacks targeting Christians through execution, burning churches, and burning hundreds of houses, which follow well-established IS tendencies to focus on and highlight attacks on Christians across its provinces.[129] The initial southward offensive aligned with a global IS campaign to maximize the group’s propaganda utility for IS central media.[130] ISMP expansion efforts in these same areas in 2022 began shortly after the group gained official provincial status in May, highlighting the group’s tendency to organize campaigns around key propaganda opportunities.[131]
The attacks have increased flows of IDPs and disrupted voter registration campaigns, undermining state legitimacy. The National Elections Commission (CNE) launched a 45-day campaign across Mozambique on March 15 to increase access to voter registration services in preparation for the October 2024 presidential election.[132] Demand for registration is particularly high in northeastern Mozambique because internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled Cabo Delgado and into Nampula without documents are eager to get a voter’s card as a form of identification.[133] The UN-affiliated International Organization for Migration reported that ISMP’s attacks in 2024 have displaced at least 110,000 people.[134]
Electoral registration brigades were evacuated in two towns in Cabo Delgado province near the border with Nampula due to ISMP attacks on April 23.[135] Seven electoral registration brigades in Nampula province stopped operating after April 10 out of fear of attacks by ISMP—about half the voter registration period, which ran from March 15 to April 28.[136] The CNE stated that it hit 91 percent of its voter registration goals for Nampula province but admitted that the projected number of registration brigades needed was too low to accommodate IDPs.[137]
The disruptions of the electoral registration risk adding to local and national grievances against the Mozambican government. Historical marginalization of northern communities has resulted in inequality and distrust in the government, which ISMP exploits for recruitment purposes.[138] Disenfranchisement would further grow this political alienation.[139] National opposition leaders also worry that the government will capitalize on displacement in the north to rig October elections in its favor.[140] The international community raised concerns about the legitimacy of local elections in October 2023 and the presidential election in 2019, calling it the least fair since the implementation of Mozambique’s multiparty system in 1994.[141]
Pending regional security force drawdowns are at odds with these trends and jeopardize investment opportunities that would strengthen the local and international economies. The South African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) is withdrawing its forces by July 15 due to a lack of funding.[142] The South African president announced the South African National Defense Forces deployed through SAMIM would stay through the end of 2024.[143] Rwandan Defense Forces deployed separately plan to stay and potentially grow their presence with additional EU funding.[144] However, Rwandan forces primarily guard key infrastructure on the coast and have not maintained pressure on growing ISMP support zones.
ISMP remains the largest hurdle in restarting construction on liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in the region that would boost the local and national economies and help alleviate international gas shortages as countries seek to find alternatives to Russian gas. TotalEnergies, a French hydrocarbon company, stated its CEO will meet soon with the Mozambican president to discuss security measures for the project.[145] Total plans to restart the Mozambique LNG project in mid-2024.[146] The insurgency has delayed the project since 2021.[147] American hydrocarbon company ExxonMobil is also exploring construction possibilities for its Rovuma LNG project as a joint majority shareholder and expects to make a final decision on its feasibility depending on the security situation in 2025.[148]
[1] https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-ouest/2024/04/30/sous-l-oeil-de-washington-teheran-negocie-avec-niamey-l-acquisition-de-300-tonnes-d-uranium,110220992-ge0; https://x.com/africa_in_fr/status/1785968816662425650?s=46&t=3jADKce4MtZBKDyf5P9itQ
[2] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/iran-scaling-up-uranium-production-and-mining-atomic-chief-says/
[3] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2023/05/04/702778/Iran-to-scale-up-yellowcake-production-by-50-,-will-run-10-more-uranium-mines-by-year-end–AEOI-chief; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-blinken-visits-west-africa-as-former-sahelian-counterterrorism-partners-continue-to-slide-into-russia-and-irans-orbit
[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62485325
[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922
[6] https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/06/27/iran-drones-morocco; https://www.newarab.com/analysis/iran-offers-diplomatic-hand-morocco-will-it-be-enough; https://www.newarab.com/news/morocco-host-israeli-drone-site-amid-anti-israel-uproar
[7] https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-ouest/2024/04/30/sous-l-oeil-de-washington-teheran-negocie-avec-niamey-l-acquisition-de-300-tonnes-d-uranium,110220992-ge0; https://x.com/africa_in_fr/status/1785968816662425650?s=46&t=3jADKce4MtZBKDyf5P9itQ; https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/niger-once-key-u-s-counterterrorism-ally-ends-military-ties-7db66dbe
[8] https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-ouest/2024/04/30/sous-l-oeil-de-washington-teheran-negocie-avec-niamey-l-acquisition-de-300-tonnes-d-uranium,110220992-ge0; https://x.com/africa_in_fr/status/1785968816662425650?s=46&t=3jADKce4MtZBKDyf5P9itQ
[9] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-has-asked-countries-region-press-iran-not-engage-war-sudan-2024-04-11
[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-cuts-2023-budget-by-40-post-coup-sanctions-bite-2023-10-07;
[11] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-08/orano-halts-uranium-treatment-in-niger-amid-sanctions-on-junta; https://www.orano.group/fr/actus/actualites-du-groupe/2023/juillet/point-de-situation-sur-les-evenements-au-niger
[12] https://tradingeconomics.com/niger/exports; https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/11/perfect-storm-nigers-uranium-amidst-sahelian-chaos
[13] https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/14948/Yellowcake_woes; https://x.com/dalatitude/status/1781358292960223453
[14] https://president dot ir/fa/151482
[15] https://president dot ir/fa/151482; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/07/3075107; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/04/26/3075236/; https://president dot ir/fa/151482
[16] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/04/25/3074668
[17] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-russia-africa-israel-terror/32917323.html
[18] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/497699/Tehran-hosting-2nd-Iran-Africa-trade-summit
[19] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-africa-why-tehran-will-boost-its-ties-continent-under-raisi-administration; https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-renewed-africa-policy-raisis-ambition-and-perception-western-decline
[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-president-raisi-begins-africa-trip-with-visit-kenya-2023-07-12
[21] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-26-2024
[22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-13-2023
[23] https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-iran-morocco-joust-for-greater-role-in-sahel-e9b6da85
[24] https://president dot ir/fa/151491; https://president dot ir/fa/151487
[25] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/08/3076030; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/08/3076029
[26] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/10/3077087
[27] https://www.irna dot ir/photo/85462128
[28] https://jsd-africa.com/Jsda/Vol13No4_Summer2011_B/PDF/Zimbabwe-Iran%20Relations%20in%20the%2021st%20Century1.pdf
[29] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-signs-economic-agreements-with-zimbabwe-raisi-ends-africa-tour-2023-07-13; https://president dot ir/fa/145451
[30] https://www.ecofinagency dot com/public-management/1010-44934-burkina-faso-reaches-new-cooperation-deals-with-iran; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/489815/Iran-Burkina-Faso-sign-8-cooperation-MOUs; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1529563/politique/liran-tend-la-main-au-niger-pour-surmonter-les-sanctions
[31] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-africa-why-tehran-will-boost-its-ties-continent-under-raisi-administration
[32] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-africa-why-tehran-will-boost-its-ties-continent-under-raisi-administration
[33] http://fna dot ir/3dkxwz; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85165410; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/201267/Iran-s-gold-for-export-receipts-top-1mt-in-March-May; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/474374/Neighborhood-policy-neutralized-U-S-sanctions; https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-gcc-connectivity-agenda-implic…; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-14-2023
[34] https://www.independent.co dot ug/africas-10-largest-gold-producers
[35] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-21-2023%C2%A0; https://www.wsj.com/world/irans-rise-as-global-arms-supplier-vexes-u-s-and-its-allies-6f205083; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85165410/%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D9%81%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%82%D8%A7
[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-niger-cuts-the-united-states-for-russia-and-iran#_edn405f4000cab7ed5a0a82453b2915cb4721
[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition
[38] https://twitter.com/AESinfos/status/1777649723161067793; https://twitter.com/fabsenbln/status/1777425142508904759
[39] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/25/burkina-faso-army-massacres-223-villagers
[40] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/25/burkina-faso-army-massacres-223-villagers
[41] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/25/burkina-faso-army-massacres-223-villagers
[42] https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/04/burkina-faso-army-linked-massacre-156-civilians; https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-military-junta-jihadis-civilian-deaths-e775658011de4c0b4352f53326f16da3
[43] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) database, available at www.acleddata.com
[44] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[45] https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/04/burkina-faso-army-linked-massacre-156-civilians; https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-military-junta-jihadis-civilian-deaths-e775658011de4c0b4352f53326f16da3
[46] https://www.voanews.com/a/burkina-faso-suspends-more-foreign-media-over-hrw-report/7588551.html
[47] https://cpj.org/2023/07/burkina-faso-suspends-third-french-media-outlet-in-under-8-months; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-junta-suspends-french-magazine-jeune-afrique-due-untruthful-article-2023-09-25
[48] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/28/world/africa/burkina-faso-military-conscription.html; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68166717; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-juntas-conscription-critics-rattles-civil-society-unions-2023-11-09; https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/27/burkina-faso-abductions-used-crack-down-dissent
[49] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/28/world/africa/burkina-faso-military-conscription.html
[50] https://www.la-croix.com/international/Le-Burkina-Faso-senfonce-terreur-2023-10-31-1201288947; https://acleddata.com/2024/03/26/actor-profile-volunteers-for-the-defense-of-the-homeland-vdp
[51] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/25/burkina-faso-army-massacres-223-villagers; https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/04/burkina-faso-army-linked-massacre-156-civilians
[52] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68166717
[53] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/29/burkina-faso-bans-more-media-outlets-over-coverage-of-alleged-massacre
[54] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale
[55] https://burkina24.com/2022/11/24/recrutement-de-vdp-plus-de-90-000-inscrits; https://acleddata.com/2024/03/26/actor-profile-volunteers-for-the-defense-of-the-homeland-vdp; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale
[56] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[57] https://information.tv5monde.com/info/burkina-faso-qui-sont-les-vdp-les-volontaires-de-defense-pour-la-patrie-437952; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale
[58] https://acleddata.com/2024/03/26/actor-profile-volunteers-for-the-defense-of-the-homeland-vdp; https://corporate.dw.com/fr/burkina-faso-linstitut-d%C3%A9tudes-de-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-volontaires-pour-la-d%C3%A9fense-de-la-patrie/av-64233571
[59] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale
[60] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/volunteers-defense-homeland; https://acleddata.com/2024/03/26/actor-profile-volunteers-for-the-defense-of-the-homeland-vdp; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale
[61] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/volunteers-defense-homeland; https://jamestown.org/program/mass-civilian-defense-force-recruitment-raises-jihadist-threat-to-civilians-in-burkina-faso; https://acleddata.com/2024/03/26/actor-profile-volunteers-for-the-defense-of-the-homeland-vdp
[62] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/volunteers-defense-homeland; https://jamestown.org/program/mass-civilian-defense-force-recruitment-raises-jihadist-threat-to-civilians-in-burkina-faso
[63] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/volunteers-defense-homeland; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale; https://acleddata.com/2024/03/26/actor-profile-volunteers-for-the-defense-of-the-homeland-vdp
[64] https://acleddata.com/2024/03/26/actor-profile-volunteers-for-the-defense-of-the-homeland-vdp
[65] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale
[66] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/how-violent-extremist-groups-exploit-intercommunal-conflicts-in-the-sahel; https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-fulani-perspectives-sahel-crisis; https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2019/06/conflicts-in-mali
[67] https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/jnim-accuses-burkinabe-army-of-killing-223-civilians-in-vengeance-for-attack-on-military-post.html
[68] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1784840004293771485
[69] https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/abu-huzeifa
[70] https://x.com/Laccent_/status/1785414566983127518; https://x.com/Mossa_ag/status/1784565318074892422
[71] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com; https://maliactu dot net/mali-le-chef-terroriste-boura-lobbi-neutralise-par-larmee; https://beninwebtv dot com/lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-mali-un-chef-jihadiste-abattu-a-tombouctou
[72] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com; https://twitter.com/SonniMaiga/status/1619350934555099136?s=20&t=oAl8vYCC_o2nBsZ1ThjoHQ
[73] https://www.maliweb dot net/armee/nord-du-mali-les-fama-neutralisent-plusieurs-3051167.html; https://twitter.com/Mossa_ag/status/1749097582733730114?s=20
[74] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1749432117589672086?s=20
[75] https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/killing-terrorist-leaders-is-no-silver-bullet; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-april-25-2024-is-somalia-expansion-benefits-is-global-network-togo-constitutional-changes#Somalia; https://www.cfr.org/blog/french-led-decapitation-strike-aqim-mali
[76] https://www.cfr.org/blog/french-led-decapitation-strike-aqim-mali; https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/why-france-failed-in-mali; https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-niger-chad
[77] https://www.icct.nl/publication/leader-isis-dead-are-targeted-killings-effective
[78] https://www.icct.nl/publication/leader-isis-dead-are-targeted-killings-effective
[79] https://apnews.com/article/mali-islamic-state-alqaida-violence-un-e841e4d5835c7fa01605e8fd1ea03fcf
[80] https://afriquexxi dot info/Dans-le-nord-est-du-Mali-l-Etat-islamique-en-voie-de-normalisation; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-september-13-sdf-lose-legitimacy-in-deir-ez-zor-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state-expand-in-west-africa-ttp-launches-offensive-in-pakistan#Mali20230913; https://afriquexxi dot info/Dans-le-nord-est-du-Mali-l-Etat-islamique-en-voie-de-normalisation; SITE Intelligence Group, “Spotlighting ‘Sahel Province’ in an-Naba 405, IS Reports Expansion of Advocacy Efforts and Execution of German Forces’ Office Employee in Mali,” August 25, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/03/12/mali-army-operations-rebel-groups-impose-suffocating-blockades; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230411-mali-le-groupe-%C3%A9tat-islamique-prend-tiderm%C3%A8ne-m%C3%A9naka-en-sursis
[81] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1723313110310617247?s=20
[82] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240424-mali-une-partie-des-otages-enlev%C3%A9s-la-semaine-derni%C3%A8re-pr%C3%A8s-de-bandiagara-a-%C3%A9t%C3%A9-lib%C3%A9r%C3%A9e; ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com; https://twitter.com/Wamaps_news/status/1782748555100184890; https://twitter.com/sergedanielinfo/status/1780307055472947436
[83] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240424-mali-une-partie-des-otages-enlev%C3%A9s-la-semaine-derni%C3%A8re-pr%C3%A8s-de-bandiagara-a-%C3%A9t%C3%A9-lib%C3%A9r%C3%A9e; https://twitter.com/Wamaps_news/status/1782748555100184890
[84] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[85] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-december-13-2023
[86] ACLED database, available at: https://acleddata.com; https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1729573887107534857; https://www.studiotamani dot org/151388-insecurite-a-bandiagara-le-nouveau-mode-operatoire-des-groupes-armes; https://twitter.com/Wamaps_news/status/1722240831757967577; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-december-13-2023
[87] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[88] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com; https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1729573887107534857; https://www.studiotamani dot org/151388-insecurite-a-bandiagara-le-nouveau-mode-operatoire-des-groupes-armes; https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/preventing-another-al-qaeda-affiliated-quasi-state-countering-jnims-strategic-civilian-engagement-in-the-sahel
[89] https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/sahel-kidnappings-less-about-ransom-more-about-expansion; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-december-13-2023; https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/sahel-kidnappings-less-about-ransom-more-about-expansion
[90] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-december-13-2023
[91] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240424-mali-une-partie-des-otages-enlev%C3%A9s-la-semaine-derni%C3%A8re-pr%C3%A8s-de-bandiagara-a-%C3%A9t%C3%A9-lib%C3%A9r%C3%A9e; https://twitter.com/Wamaps_news/status/1782748555100184890; https://www.theafricareport.com/314621/a-behind-the-scenes-look-at-al-qaedas-kidnapping-strategy-in-the-sahel; https://adf-magazine.com/2023/08/new-report-examines-al-qaidas-kidnapping-strategy-in-the-sahel
[92] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-december-13-2023
[93] https://www.echosmedias dot org/2024/04/23/situation-securitaire-au-pays-dogon-les-forces-vives-de-bandiagara-interpellent-les-autorites; https://twitter.com/Wamaps_news/status/1782748555100184890; https://twitter.com/Ocisse691/status/1783199019998798159
[94] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-december-13-2023
[95] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com; https://twitter.com/SLEL23/status/1785036292712992778
[96] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[97] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com; https://twitter.com/SLEL23/status/1785036292712992778; https://twitter.com/SLEL23/status/1785036292712992778
[98] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1341823/politique/mali-trois-camps-de-larmee-attaques-par-des-terroristes; SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Reports Control over Malian Army Post Following Attack in Mopti, Details 4-Man Suicide Raid on Russian PMC Wagner Group in Segou,”July 26, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com; https://x.com/ocisse691/status/1683594569659629568?s=20
[99] ACLED, available at: https://acleddata.com; https://twitter.com/Wamaps_news/status/1779883958332703178
[100] ACLED, available at: https://acleddata.com
[101] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-december-13-2023
[102] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-december-13-2023
[103] https://www.reuters.com/world/somalia-detains-us-trained-commandos-over-theft-rations-2024-04-26; https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-reports-food-diversion-involving-us-trained-soldiers/7585994.html; https://shabellemedia dot com/american-official-confirms-to-shabelle-tv-that-the-us-stopped-food-rations-to-danab-forces
[104] https://www.voanews.com/a/us-to-review-support-for-elite-somali-military-unit-/6286599.html
[105] https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1E81XV
[106] https://so.usembassy.gov/united-states-donates-9-million-in-weapons-and-equipment-to-support-the-somali-national-army; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/10/somalia-war-shabab-danab-military; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/27/us/politics/somalia-commandos-counterterrorism.html
[107] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setbacks-somalia-war-against-al-shabaab-james-barnett
[108] https://so.usembassy.gov/united-states-increases-security-assistance-through-construction-of-sna-bases
[109] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/10/somalia-war-shabab-danab-military; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/27/us/politics/somalia-commandos-counterterrorism.html
[110]https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/27/us/politics/somalia-commandos-counterterrorism.html; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b187-sustaining-gains-somalias-offensive-against-al-shabaab; https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setbacks-somalia-war-against-al-shabaab-james-barnett
[111] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b187-sustaining-gains-somalias-offensive-against-al-shabaab
[112] https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/somalia-militants-war-on-terror-b633ac07
[113] https://twitter.com/inside_africaa/status/1784594787124867550; https://thesomalidigestdotcom/al-shabab-regains-strategic-locations-in-middle-shabelle-amid-clan-rivalries
[114] https://www.caasimada dot net/ciidamada-xoogga-dalka-oo-dib-ula-wareegay-deegaanka-cali-fooldheere; https://twitter.com/Hammrawi_/status/1784143647438492084
[115] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-october-4-2023#SOM20231004; https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/1699817775374516508; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1703632032440479980?s=20; https://shabellemedia dot com/faah-faahino-ka-soo-baxay-duqeymo-ka-socda-gobolka-shabeelaha-dhexe; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1709243460790759699?s=20; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1708691876700626987?s=20; https://atmis-au.org/en/so-atmis-iyo-ciidanka-xoogga-dalka-soomaaliyeed-oo-sameeyey-iskaashi-milatari-ayaa-al-shabaab-ka-saaray-keymaha-cali-fooldheere
[116] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-october-4-2023#SOM20231004; https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/1699817775374516508; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1703632032440479980?s=20; https://shabellemedia dot com/faah-faahino-ka-soo-baxay-duqeymo-ka-socda-gobolka-shabeelaha-dhexe; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1709243460790759699?s=20; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1708691876700626987?s=20; https://atmis-au.org/en/so-atmis-iyo-ciidanka-xoogga-dalka-soomaaliyeed-oo-sameeyey-iskaashi-milatari-ayaa-al-shabaab-ka-saaray-keymaha-cali-fooldheere
[117] https://thesomalidigest dot com/al-shabab-regains-strategic-locations-in-middle-shabelle-amid-clan-rivalries
[118] https://x.com/ShabelleMedia/status/1772559097784627435; https://www.caasimada dot net/al-shabaab-oo-shaaciyey-magaca-iyo-beesha-ninkii-isku-qarxiyey-albaabka-hotel-syl; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/al-shabaab-launches-deadly-attack-military-base-somalia-2024-03-23
[119] https://thesomalidigest dot com/al-shabab-regains-strategic-locations-in-middle-shabelle-amid-clan-rivalries
[120] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-october-4-2023#SOM20231004
[121] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-october-4-2023#SOM20231004
[122] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-october-4-2023#SOM20231004
[123] https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-19-february-3-march-2024; https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-4-17-march-2024
[124] https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-19-february-3-march-2024; https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-4-17-march-2024
[125] https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-19-february-3-march-2024; https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-update-4-17-march-2024
[126] https://www.zitamar dot com/the-insurgency-returns-to-nampula
[127] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[128] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[129] https://clubofmozambique dot com/news/mozambique-terrorists-attack-in-erati-district-aim-report-257498; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-march-28-2024-islamic-state-resurgent-in-mozambique-al-shabaabs-ramadan-offensive#Mozambique
[130] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-january-10-2024
[131] https://acleddata.com/2023/10/30/actor-profile-islamic-state-mozambique-ism; ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com
[132] https://clubofmozambiquedotcom/news/mozambique-elections-voter-registration-to-begin-on-15-march-253326
[133] https://cipeleicoes dot org/eng
[134] https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/over-110000-displaced-mozambique-amidst-surging-violence-needs-soar
[135] https://cipeleicoes dot org/eng
[136] https://clubofmozambique dot com/news/mozambique-mazanga-monitors-electoral-registration-in-nampula-257307
[137] https://clubofmozambique dot com/news/mozambique-mazanga-monitors-electoral-registration-in-nampula-257307; https://allafrica dot com/stories/202404250113.html
[138] https://www.csis.org/analysis/mozambique-nation-unrealized-potential
[139] https://www.csis.org/analysis/winning-cabo-delgado
[140] https://cipeleicoes dot org/eng
[141] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2024-elections/mozambique
[142] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-march-28-2024-islamic-state-resurgent-in-mozambique-al-shabaabs-ramadan-offensive#Mozambique; https://360mozambique do tcom/development/cabo-delgado-samim-military-personnel-have-already-started-delivering-material-ahead-of-the-final-withdrawal
[143] https://www.military dot africa/2024/04/south-africa-extends-military-deployment-in-mozambique
[144] https://www.news24 dot com/news24/africa/news/rwanda-to-send-more-troops-to-mozambique-as-south-african-soldiers-prepare-to-leave-20240405
[145] https://lngprime.com/africa/totalenergies-ceo-mozambique-lng-restart-is-not-a-matter-of-costs/110827
[146] https://lngprime.com/africa/totalenergies-ceo-mozambique-lng-restart-is-not-a-matter-of-costs/110827
[147] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/totalenergies-restart-its-delayed-mozambique-lng-project-early-2024-sources-2023-12-22
[148] https://www.exxonmobillng.com/en/about-us/trending-topics/rovuma-lng-project-in-mozambique-awards-onshore-epc-contract; https://www.exxonmobil.co dot mz/about/who-we-are/rovuma-lng; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ceraweek-exxon-ahead-schedule-doubling-lng-portfolio-exec-says-2024-03-21; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-11/exxon-mobil-expects-mozambique-lng-investment-decision-in-2025
Source link : https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-2-2024-iran-pursues-economic-and-military-influence
Author :
Publish date : 2024-05-02 07:00:00
Copyright for syndicated content belongs to the linked Source.
